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Abstract 
This note reports on interdisciplinary approaches to model consciousness, an aspect of self-awareness in particular, aiming at artificial 
consciousness that can be mounted on an autonomous and mobile robot. For self-awareness to emerge, the self-identification process 
plays an important role. Self-awareness would emerge when self-locating in a self-created map in robot navigation; when solving self-
related problems in (a self-related version of) the frame problem; and when a singularity arises in mapping the reference point in 
mathematical mappings.  
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1. Introduction 
Consciousness has been discussed in various areas5,6,9,12-15,17-19 encompassing philosophy, cognitive science, artificial 
intelligence (AI) and robotics, to name a few. Such discussions have covered diverse issues such as self-awareness, free-will, 
qualia and so forth. This paper focuses on self-awareness in artificial general intelligence (strong AI) and robotics, and the 
frame problem in particular, which aims to enable autonomous robots to solve self-related parts in the frame problem. 
Studies of consciousness have examined self-awareness20 and free-will9 in order to answer what they are; whether they 
can emerge even for machines (computers)12; and how they can be implemented on computers or robots. This note focuses 
on the problem of how self-awareness may be characterized in three domains: the robot navigation (robot self-locating) 
problem in robotics; the frame problem (self-modeling problem) in AI; and fixed points and singularity (in a self-mapping) 
in mathematics. 
These three views make it possible to explain oneness, invariance, and free-will, respectively. Another important 
property of consciousness is a feeling of time flow, which cannot emerge from a logical inference system with binary values 
of true or false. Imaginary values are also required to introduce oscillation and thus allow a feeling of time. Consciousness 
will be modeled as a majority network which has a mode of oscillation. 
Nomenclature 
x(t) = (x1(t), …, xN(t)) the state of nodes 1, 2, …, N of a network at time t 
{xs: f(xs) = xs }  fixed points of a function f(x) 
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We suppose that self-awareness emerges as a result of continuous self-imaging and self-identification from sensory 
inputs in animals which are autonomous and mobile agents. We also conjecture that self-awareness has a merit of increasing 
the survivability of mobile agents and has evolved for intelligent mobile agents such as humans. Humans have a world 
model in reasoning many things, and self-awareness plays a critical role for self-related problems as mobile agents. Moving 
the (self) body to a place is an example of self-related problems as a mobile agent. 
For realizing some aspects (such as self-awareness) of consciousness as an operating system (OS) for autonomous and 
mobile robots, not only philosophical discussions in AI but also engineering discussions in robot navigation and formal 
discussions in mathematics may be needed. In order to explain the hypothesis that self-awareness may be a continuous self-
identification, our approach involves three distinct fields: robot navigation in robotics; world and self-modeling in AI; and 
fixed points and singularity in mathematics. Each of these three fields has its own role in this study: robot navigation to give 
examples; AI to set problems; and mathematics to formalize.  
To fully utilize the parallelism among these three fields, Sections 2, 3 and 4 are organized in parallel. Section 2 
characterizes self-awareness using robot navigation problems. Section 3 characterizes self-awareness in self-related problem 
solving using a frame problem. Section 4 characterizes self-awareness as singularity of self-mapping. Section 5 discusses 
how other aspects of consciousness may be related using the characterization of self-awareness. Section 6 suggests the 
difficulty of realizing free-will with machines and leaves the characterization and formalization of free-will as future 
challenges.  
2. Robot Navigation Problem as an Extendable Component for Robot OS with Self-Awareness 
2.1. Self-awareness is “for-by-of” self-identification 
Mobile robot navigation can be used to explain the consciousness emerging from the self-identification process, since an 
important function of consciousness is also to navigate the self as a mobile agent in a physical space. Indeed, both self-
localization (self-identification in a physical space) and building a map (world modeling) in which the location is identified 
are critical in robot navigation as well as in the act of consciousness.  
Mapping from sensory inputs to internal images may be captured by the concept of fixed points with an updating function, 
or invariant sets in dynamical systems. Dynamical systems have been widely used to characterize consciousness.1,6 Consider 
a networked automaton expressed as a network. Each automaton (expressed as a node) can take inputs from the external 
world or from the outputs of other automata, and can feed its output to other automata. Let x = (x1, …, xN) be the sensory 
input to nodes 1, 2, …, N. We denote x(t) = (x1(t), …, xN(t)) as the state of nodes 1, 2, …, N at time t. The state of nodes is 
updated by a function f(x) and the fixed points xs that satisfy f(xs) = xs are the mapped image of the sensory input. As an 
example of a networked automaton, the majority network is explained in Example 6. 
2.2. Robotic mapping: a primitive toward a robot OS realizing self-awareness 
To focus on the robot navigation problem, we assume that the feature of the world objects of interest is only their position 
and their inter-relation (relative positions).  
 
Example 1. (Positioning a target object: a robot with a sensor) 
The simplest example to locate a target object with a sensor is: a robot mounted with a sensor that can detect whether the 
target object exists within the area of a circle with a constant radius. If the sensor on the robot cannot narrow down the 
target position, the robot moves and tries again (Fig. 1). The target object can be positioned relative to the robot, rather like 
drawing a Venn diagram in set theory and finding the intersection of the circle areas which the sensor detected. 
 
Fig. 1.  A robot mounted with a sensor that can detect a target object (star mark) in a 
circle centered on the robot.  
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By locating landmark objects and identifying their relative positions, a map for the robot can be created. Current robot 
technology uses a sophisticated map such as those involving probabilistic representations.  
2.3. Robotic self-locating: another primitive toward a robot OS realizing self-awareness 
Let us proceed to a self-related problem: self-locating in the map. Although self-locating can be done precisely with a 
global map such as the latitude-longitude coordinate system of the Global Positioning System (GPS) using GPS satellites, 
the following example uses an old navigator to clarify what we mean by self-discrimination and self-identification within the 
context of self-locating.  
 
Example 2. (Positioning itself: a robot with an old navigator) 
Suppose a robot with an old navigator wants to locate itself. The robot can know all the robots in the vicinity as dots on a 
map in real-time, but how can it know which dot is itself among these three dots? If a robot moves differently from other 
robots for self-discrimination (e.g., circling) (Fig. 2), then the robot can know that the circling dot is itself, which we call 
self-identification. 
 
2.4. Self-awareness is online real-time self-locating in a self-created map with self-mounted sensors 
Self-awareness restricted to self-locating in the world map comes from continuous and real-time self-identification based 
on sensors matching the real (true) self-position felt by the robot itself. Suppose a robot has not only sensors for positioning 
external objects (and an intelligent mechanism that not only relates these external objects (to create a map) but also relates 
these external objects with itself (to locate itself within the map)), but also sensors for monitoring the internal state of itself 
such as the orientation of the robot and for how long the robot moved. In this case, the robot can solve the self-locating 
problem in two ways: either by creating a map and locating itself within the map by the sensors for positioning external 
objects; or by monitoring itself and locating itself relative to the initial position. The robot can self-identify continuously by 
doing online and real-time matching between the two self-positions sensed in these two ways.  
We suggest that self-related problems (with self-monitoring sensors) are important for designing self-aware robots with 
artificial consciousness since humans as ultimate self-related problem solvers maintain their identity by continuous self-
discrimination and self-identification with the immune system, which could be a driving force for next-generation AI. The 
first step to developing robots with artificial consciousness is to deal with the self-related problems. 
3. Frame Problem to Place Self-Awareness in Self-Related Problem Solving 
3.1. Self-awareness is “for-by-of” self-management in self-related problem solving 
A simple way of assessing the intelligence of an animal is to place a mirror in front of the animal. If the animal identifies 
its self-image in the mirror as himself/herself, then we can assume that the animal has a certain level of intelligence, i.e., a 
self-related problem-solving capability enabled not only by world modeling but also by self-identification in the world 
model. We use the frame problem2 as a starting point to remind ourselves that self-related problem solving is imperative for 
AI to deal with the frame problem. The point is that not AI with a conventional problem solver but AI involving the self-
related problem solver is imperative, which can be a first step toward AI that has self-awareness or even consciousness. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  A robot with a navigator that can locate all the robots in the vicinity as dots on 
a map in real-time. A robot can identify which dot is itself by moving differently from 
other robots (e.g., circling). 
 
1868   Yoshiteru Ishida /  Procedia Computer Science  60 ( 2015 )  1865 – 1874 
Problem 1. (A frame problem: a self-related analogical reasoning) 
Suppose a fire breaks out in a house. The entire family except for one baby escapes from the house. An intelligent robot 
is asked to fetch the baby. The robot has AI that includes not only a general problem solver but also a self-related problem 
solver that enables the robot to move to a position from where it can extend its arms, hold the baby without crushing it, and 
even carry the baby with a posture that allows the baby to breathe, etc. However, since the robot also has a general problem 
solver with the important heuristic of separating the target object into components which can be held and carried more 
efficiently and independently, the robot fetches the head, body, arms, and legs of the baby independently. 
With this frame problem modified to focus on self-related problem solving, it is important to consider not only self-
related analogical reasoning (compassion), but also the management function of consciousness as well as expanding the 
world model to include the self, which we want to define as the act of free-will. 
3.2. World modeling: a primitive to deal with self-related problems 
To deal with the frame problem, robots need to be able to recognize objects and relate the recognized objects in world 
modeling. The following example illustrates that even humans can experience visual illusion if the mapping in object 
recognition involves redundant mappings. 
 
Example 3. (Necker Cube: an illusion in object recognition)7 
Although the cube consists of 12 line segments, we focus on six of them (we could alternatively use six faces). These six 
segments are numbered as shown in Fig. 37. These numbers also indicate the numbers (labels) of the nodes in a sensory part 
(left-side nodes in the bipartite graph shown in Fig. 3). When node i in the sensory part is paired to node j f (b) in the 
recognition part (right-side in the bipartite graph shown in Fig. 3), then the automaton understands that bar i is in the front 
(behind). Thus, the two mappings create two understandings of the cube in the assignment shown in Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
It is interesting that the matching mechanism used for object recognition may be used for relating recognized objects in 
the world modeling. Although object recognition may be realized in a discrete space in the above example, it can also be 
realized as a stable equilibrium in a continuous space. 
3.3. Relating the self: another primitive to deal with self-related problems 
As an example of relating the self in the self-created world model, we use a simplified one where the world model is a 
one-dimensional network where each node is labeled so that the self can be readily related. The following example again 
concerns the robot self-locating problem, and is indirectly (through the book by Diaconis and Graham2) based on Sinden’s 
idea that labeling the path under the robot with a de Bruijn sequence allows the robot to locate itself on the path. 
 
Example 4. (Object recognition when the object is the self) 
Suppose a robot lives in a one-dimensional network world where each node is labeled by a letter, and hence its world 
model is also a one-dimensional network, which can be trivially realized by copying the world to its memory as a one-
dimensional network with the label. Also suppose that the only concern for the robot is the self-location problem. If the 
Fig. 3.  Perceptual switching experienced when observing the Necker Cube. A cube whose 
six line segments are numbered (left). Two matchings showing two possible interpretations 
(middle). Two cubes corresponding two understandings to the matchings (right). 
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robot has a sensor that can read letters in the neighborhood of its position (three consecutive letters: the letter where the 
robot is located and one node ahead and one node behind in case of Sinden’s idea), then the robot can self-locate in its world 
model. 
 
 
In this example, the world and the world model are identical. Sinden proposed that a labeling on the path by a de Bruijn 
sequence allows the robot to self-locate on the path4. 
Since self-related problems (self-locating problem in this example) can be a critical problem for animals, it may be 
important to self-identify through several sensors with distinct modes (e.g., sight, hearing, touch, smell), and to check the 
results of the self-identification on their cognitive map with consistency against itself. 
3.4. Self-awareness is recognizing itself in the self-related problem solving 
For a robot with (strong) AI to deal with self-related problems as found in the frame problem, the AI in the robot requires 
a self-related problem solver. To determine whether we can call emergent phenomena (if they were to emerge) self-
awareness or not, we must ask the robot how it feels, or perhaps ask the robot to define the synchronized mode (what is 
identified with the real self) as self-awareness. 
It should also be noted that humans (as sophisticated self-related problem solvers) are always dealing with self-related 
problems. Writing, submitting and (if accepted) publishing this note itself is an act of attempting to relate the self (this note 
on self-awareness) to the world model (a literature network on the consciousness), to solve the self-related problem. 
4. Fixed Points and Singularity to Formalize Self-Awareness 
4.1. Self-awareness is “for-by-of” singularity in fixed points in a mapping 
An important property of the (globally stable) fixed point is that it can start from an arbitrary state, and the image (result) 
is fed again and again.  
When you first bought an electronic calculator, you might have enjoyed some mathematical experiments: if the calculator 
has a button for calculating a specific function, say the square root of an input value, you first input any value larger than 
one and calculate its square root. Then you input this result and calculate its square root. If you continue this procedure 
many times, the value becomes closer to 1, which is one of the fixed points of the square root function: ݂ሺݔሻ ൌ ξݔ. Even 
this elementary arithmetic experiment indicates two important things: the value (fixed point) obtained does not depend on 
the initial input value (provided that it is not smaller than 1); and this fixed point experiment can be done not only for the 
square root function, but for many other functions that make the given value (greater than 1) smaller than the given value but 
still greater than 1; or for functions that make the given value (smaller than 1) greater than the given value but still smaller 
than 1.  
The self-referential paradox is also attributed to fixed points of functions. Consider the sentence: “this sentence is false.” 
If we believe this sentence is true, then it must be false as asserted, while if we believe otherwise then it must be true; thus 
the logical value oscillates. That is x1 = f(x2); x2 refers to x1 to determine x2, that is, x2 = f(x1), which together lead to x1 = 
f(f(x1)) and x2 = f(f(x2)). We can say that both x1 and x2 are fixed points of the double-folded function f(f(x)); or that the set 
{x1, x2} is an invariant set of the function f(x). The following example is also the same case. 
 
 㻌
a b c d e f g h i j 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Fig. 4.  A robot living in a one-dimensional world where each place is labeled by a letter 
can self-locate itself in its world model (indicated by a red arrow) by sensing and 
identifying the letters in the neighborhood of its position. 
㻌
World Model 
  
 
World 
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Example 5. (A fixed point expressed as an imaginary value is oscillation as time involved behavior) 
Let us use the function: f(x) = െ ଵ௫. If we try to determine the value of x = f(x) and assign the value x = 1, then x = −1, 
however assigning x = −1 would make x = 1. This oscillation is also due to the self-reference: using x itself to determine the 
value of x. 
 
It is well known that the latter case of mathematical self-reference of a function can be resolved by involving an 
imaginary value, however the former case of logical self-reference can be consistently explained by introducing an 
imaginary value10. Imaginary values in logic may also be related in quantum computation as “square root of negation”.4 
The introduction of imaginary values in the real world in effect means the introduction of a new dimension in the real 
world: the time dimension. That is, since we cannot determine between mutually excluding values x = 1 and x = −1 (true or 
false in logic), we introduce time dimension x(t) = 1 and x(t + 1) = −1. Indeed, oscillation would happen instead of the 
logical paradox and value-determining deadlock as noted in Section 6. Time flow is a result of the imaginary value that adds 
the time dimension to logical values. 
The majority network is a networked automaton whose state at time t is x(t) = (x1(t), …, xN(t)) which is updated by the 
majority function x(t + 1) = f(x(t)) where xi(t) represents the state of node i. The majority function determines its next state 
as the majority state of the nodes adjacent to the node. For tiebreaks, if two states requiring a tiebreak are not the same state 
as the current state of the automaton, then randomly choose either of the two. If one of the two states requiring a tiebreak is 
the same as the current state of the automaton, then the automaton remains in that state in the next step, too. 
 
Example 6. (Majority network expressed as a generalized bipartite graph)8 
The majority network expressed as a generalized bipartite graph is shown in Fig. 58. A generalized bipartite graph 
consists of two parts such that each node in the graph must satisfy the condition that the o-degree is greater than the i-degree 
where inner-degree (i-degree) is the number of edges with the nodes in the same part, and outer-degree (o-degree) is that 
with the nodes in the other part. 
 
Majority networks have several interesting properties; we focus here on their stability. Any of the majority networks 
defined above will converge on either a fixed point (attractor with period one) or an alternating state (attractor with period 
two), regardless of the graphical structure and the number of states allowed. The existence of a fixed point (xs, xs, …, xs) is 
trivial by the definition of the majority network. The existence of an alternating state (x1, …, x1; x2, …, x2) and (x2, …, x2; x1, 
…, x1) can be also understood when the network is drawn as a generalized bipartite graph (Fig. 5) where the states of the 
nodes belonging to the left part are specified by the first M elements before the semicolon and those for the right part by the 
last N elements after the semicolon: (x1(t), …, xM(t); xM+1(t), …, xM+N(t)). 
 
4.2. Defining a map: a primitive to formalize self-awareness 
To focus on the robot navigation problem, we assume that the feature of the world objects of interest is only their position 
and their relation among the world objects (relative positions). 
 
Example 7. (Graph isomorphism) 
A graph is a mathematical structure consisting of a set of nodes and a set of edges connecting the nodes. For one graph 
G(NG, EG) to be isomorphic to another graph H(NH, EH), not only the set of nodes NG to be mapped to NH with a bijection 
Fig. 5.  An example of a generalized bipartite graph in the initial condition, after which 
the state will oscillate (attractor with period two). The state is indicated by the color (blue 
and red) as well as by the number (1 and 0), respectively.㻌
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but also the connecting structure must be preserved, i.e., when two nodes are (not) connected in G their mapped nodes must 
be (not) connected in H (Fig. 6). 
 
As illustrated by the above Example 7, in defining a map from the world to the world model, not only must objects be 
recognized and mapped to the counterparts in the model, but also the relation among the objects must be preserved from the 
world to the world model. We note that graph isomorphism can be done in a dual manner: first map the set of edges and 
then check the edge connection to the nodes. This would suggest that object recognition as well as object relationing may be 
done by the same mechanism: fixed point identification in the mapping.  
Graph isomorphism is known to belong to NP but not yet even associated to NP-complete. This would suggest that 
matching the objects and their relations between the world and the world model is computationally intensive with the 
currently known algorithms.  
4.3. Recognizing singularity: another primitive to formalize self-awareness 
In the mathematical formalization of self-awareness, one possible way is to involve singularity in mappings. The following 
example of a Riemann sphere illustrates singularity. 
 
Example 8. (Riemann sphere) 
In mapping from a point on a sphere to the plane cutting the Equator (regarding the sphere as the Earth) of the sphere as 
illustrated in Fig. 7, mapping can be done by drawing a line from the North Pole (the reference point) to the plane. Although 
this approach maps successfully almost all the points on the sphere to the plane, a singularity arises when we try to map the 
North Pole (the reference point itself). 
 
 
 
We assume that a singular feeling of self-awareness comes from singularity similar to that defined in the above Example 
8, for the self acts as a reference point in the (cognitive) world modeling, and also the recognizing agent and the object 
being recognized must be equated. 
Fig. 6.  The graph G on the left is isomorphic to the graph H on the right. The bijection 
from the set of nodes in the left graph to those in the right graph is indicated in the 
middle by arrows. The one-to-one correspondence is also indicated by the same letter. If 
two nodes are (not) adjacent in the left graph, their mapped nodes must (not) be adjacent 
in the right graph to be isomorphic. 
Fig. 7.  Mapping from a point on a sphere (green dot) to a point on a plane (black dot) 
cutting through the Equator of the sphere (red circle) requires the North Pole (red dot) to 
be referenced. A singularity occurs when mapping the reference point itself. 
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4.4. Self-awareness is a singularity in a mapping of the world modeling 
Let us regard the world modeling as a map from the world to the world model. Then the map can be regarded as an 
automorphism when the world modeling is successful enough to regard the world model as homomorphic to the world, and 
we can conceive fixed points in the automorphism (the map from the one mathematical structure to itself). Object 
recognition can be regarded as fixed points in the automorphism (time parameterized function from a set to the set). For the 
world modeling to be complete, the mapping should involve checking the consistency of relationships as conceived from the 
graph automorphism example (Example 7).  
 To characterize self-awareness as a singularity, the self should be placed as an object in the above world mapping. The 
self can be characterized as a fixed point (the self is one object to be mapped in the world modeling), but the significance of 
the self is the singularity that the self makes, for the self is used as a reference for relating objects (e.g., their coordinates can 
be relative to the self) in the world modeling. The singularity may be understood by analogy to the singularity in the 
Riemann’s mapping from a sphere to a plane (Example 8).  
Although we characterized self-awareness as singularity of fixed points, the fixed points of double-folded character of the 
operator and operands may be attributed to the fixed points of f(f) = f whose solution depends on the mathematical structure 
of the function space itself. When self-awareness is characterized as double-folded fixed points of f(f) = f, it requires not 
only automorphism but also the set of functions must be equal to the set to be mapped (domain) and the set of being mapped 
(co-domain). We consider that DNA self-replication is an example of this type of fixed points when DNA works as an 
operator and an operand resulting in the copy of itself. 
5. Discussion 
Since consciousness has many aspects (not only self-awareness), it is highly likely that other aspects such as free-will 
may be required to deal with self-related problems as found in the frame problem. However, several phenomena may be 
tentatively explained from the above characterization of self-awareness. 
Oneness comes from that the self (as an object in the world) is identified continuously as oneself (as a mapped object in 
the world model). Continuity (or feeling of time-flow) comes from the fact that this self-identification is successfully and 
unconsciously done throughout time. When this self-identification is not successful, strange things will happen to oneself, as 
is experienced while dreaming when asleep. This mis-identification of the self occurs due to the insufficiency of sensed data 
because visual sensing is not working, even though auditory sensing can work from time to time, which could cause framing 
of the strange stories in dreams. We suppose this self-identification process is always working unconsciously, and the 
unconscious process may be made conscious when the self-identification fails to work properly; this can be experienced as 
motion sickness when subjected to extreme motion (e.g., in a rotating cup at a fairground). Not only self-identification but 
also object recognition is a continuous and unconscious process, for we can experience optical illusions such as the Necker 
Cube and Rubin’s base. 
It can be imagined that emotions play a certain role in self-related problem solving. Compassion is explained as a self-
related analogical reasoning (Problem 1). Anger can be assigned a role in the self-related problem of competition involving 
the self (including fight). Sadness may play a role in preserving the self and offspring (the self genes). It is interesting that 
compassion is often associated with sadness; this could be explained by the fact that the associations emerge in an attempt to 
preserve self-similar objects such as pet animals in addition to offspring.  
This note is limited to the discussion of consciousness inferred from several properties such as oneness, continuity, time-
flow, free-will, and qualia. These properties derive from the fact that humans are animals, which are moving and self-
surviving agents. It is tempting to define consciousness in a general fashion that could encompass entire animals and even 
plants, however, this note is limited to humans, and so focuses on the consciousness of humans as an animal species.  
 A motivation of the frame problem (Problem 1) is to examine the significance of self-related problems, and that 
consciousness and its character of self-awareness and free-will play a significant role in solving self-related problems. 
Without self-related problem solving, a robot cannot even move to a position from where it can extend its arms, or even if 
the robot does reach the position, it cannot hold a baby without crushing it, or even if the robot can gently hold the baby it 
may not be able to carry the baby with a posture that allows it to breathe.  
Another motivation for the above paradox is that solving the self-related problem may be important for problem solving: 
analogical reasoning applied to the self. Analogical reasoning is an important component of AI, for it can be applied to 
events and entities that have a similar structure. When analogical reasoning is applied to the self, such feelings as 
compassion emerge. The significance of compassion in solving self-related problems may not require further explanation 
than the modified version of the frame problem (Problem 1). It is also possible that developmental disorders found even in 
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adults may be the result of components of the brain in charge of self-related modeling and/or solving. Modeling of 
consciousness would contribute to understanding several emotions and also should be constructed on the basis of emotions.  
 
6. A Challenge: Free-will and Robot Mutual Avoiding Paradox 
Free-will, which is a significant aspect of consciousness, plays an important role in self-related problem solving. Free-
will allows a problem-solving agent to choose options freely without any constraints. To suggest its difficulty in logic, we 
modify an idiom derived from Chinese literature of Han Feizi into a paradox (Paradox 1) in a robot navigation context. The 
idiom is MU-JYUN in Japanese where MU means a pike and JYUN means a shield, suggesting a contradiction when both a 
complete pike (that can pierce any shield) and a complete shield (that can protect from any pike) exist. The Japanese word 
MU-JYUN, which means contradiction, originates from this idiom. 
 
Paradox 1. (Robot mutual avoiding paradox) 
Two robots, Alice and Bob, are traveling in opposite directions when they meet in the middle of a one-dimensional road 
with two lanes, facing and trying to avoid each other (Fig. 8). Alice has AI that can predict the behavior of other robots, 
while Bob has AI that can respond to the contrary of any prediction by other robots. In the simplest version, Alice has an 
automaton that can output Right (Left) when Bob’s automaton outputs Right (Left); and Bob has an automaton that can 
output Right (Left) when Alice’s automaton outputs Left (Right). 
 
This paradox aims to show the significance of symmetry-breaking when the problem is fixed to symmetric situations that 
hamper the problem to be solved. If one of the agents in the above paradox is human, then the human can recognize the 
symmetric situation and will break the symmetry by asking the robot to remain still for a moment. We suppose the two 
components of symmetry recognition and symmetry breaking in self-related problem solving are significant acts of 
consciousness, namely self-awareness and free-will. 
One may argue that the above symmetry recognition and breaking may be solved without considering the act of 
consciousness by explicitly implementing a protocol (e.g., right lane only) for both robots. But how can they come up with 
the protocol and how can they negotiate to make the protocol common? There are, however, many more self-related 
problems even when restricted to the simple paradox. The point is that they are not enumerated and described beforehand, 
so self-related problems cannot be solved in principle. Logically, this is similar to the fact that one cannot prove problems 
by giving examples, with the exception of mathematical induction where the problems have symmetry with which entire 
problems of interest will be systematically enumerated. It seems to be impossible to implement free-will on any automaton 
by definition: free-will must be free from any constraints on choosing options, whereas an automaton determines its 
behavior (outputs and state transition) depending on constraints (state-transition rule). If we attribute symmetry-breaking 
(expanding options or expanding the world model freely) to free-will, it would be even harder for any automaton to realize. 
There is a solution, however, to avoid this mutual deadlock. Let us return to the paradox in terms of time. If there is no 
delay time at all from sensing and decision-making to actions, then Alice and Bob are in a complete deadlock standing still 
and facing each other. If we allow the inclusion of a delay time for Alice or Bob but the time is too small, then Alice and 
Bob oscillate with periodic behavior: RLRLRL … (in their actions or their automaton outputs). However, if the delay time is 
long enough to cover one period of the oscillation then they can successfully break the symmetry without resorting to the act 
of free-will (or consciousness). Such deadlock and oscillation are parallel counterparts to solving the imaginary value and 
oscillated behavior of the function in Example 5. It is suggested that free-will is difficult to attain artificially, but we can 
seek a possible solution in symmetry-breaking by unavoidably and unintentionally including delay times in robots in the real 
Fig. 8.  Two robots: Alice (left) and Bob (right) with two omnipotent AI: 
Alice can predict any behavior of other robots, while Bob can respond to 
the contrary of any prediction by other robots. They are deadlocked in a 
one-dimensional world with two lanes.  
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world (indeed, the immune system actively uses errors). In a global design of a collection of robots, heterogeneous robots 
may be a solution, just as the immune system actively uses diversification.  
Since these self-related problems are often conflicting and have trade-offs, consciousness must play a role in managing 
and reconciling them. Emotions may play a role in (or result from) the reconciliation process in self-related problem solving. 
Formalizing free-will and characterizing it as a problem of automatons, whether it exists or not1,9,11,16, similarly to the 
halting problem of the Turing machine, is a challenge not only for strong AI but also for autonomous robotics and even for 
singular points and fixed points of the world modeling as a mapping. 
7. Conclusions 
We have characterized self-awareness (an aspect of consciousness) as self-identification. The characterization 
incorporates parallel arguments from three problems in each of three domains: navigation in robotics, the frame problem in 
artificial intelligence (AI) and singularity of fixed points in mathematics. The aspect of self-awareness alone cannot deal 
with the self-related version of the frame problem. Aspects of free-will such as choosing options freely and expanding the 
options by reframing the world model are needed, but their characterization is another challenge. 
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